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Abstract
develop sophisticated knowledge from minimal beginnings. The goal of this paper is more modest, however:
Recent developments in philosophy, linguistics, develto show that Neo can acquire concepts and categories
opmental psychology and arti cial intelligence make it
from interacting with its environment.
possible to envision a developmental path for an arCategorization, as Lako points out, is central to huti cial agent, grounded in activity-based sensorimotor
man
thought (Lako 1984). It is also central to Lako
representations. This paper describes how Neo, an arti cial agent, learns concepts by interacting with its
and Johnson's challenge to Objectivism (Johnson 1987;
simulated environment. Relatively little prior strucLako & Johnson 1980; Lako 1984), the dominant view
ture is required to learn fairly accurate representations
in Western philosophy that there is an objective way
of objects, activities, locations and other aspects of
to represent the world and reason about it. In uenced
Neo's experience. We show how classes (categories) can
by Eleanor Rosch's research on categorization, Lako
be abstracted from these representations, and discuss
how our representation might be extended to express
and Johnson argue that categories are based less on
physical schemas, general, domain-independent activiobjective features such as color, size, and shape, than
ties that could be the building blocks of concept formaon interactional properties and relationships, such as
tion.
\graspable" and \ ts-in-my-mouth," which characterize how an agent interacts with its environment. At the
same time, AI researchers such as Agre (Agre 1988),
Chapman (Chapman 1991), and Ballard (Ballard 1989)
Introduction
have argued for deictic or agent-centered representations. Lako and Johnson make a convincing case that
Our goal is to build a baby, or rather, an arti cial agent
adult conceptual structures are grounded in primitive
who lives in a simulated environment and who eveninteractional knowledge that could very well be acquired
tually learns to think like a three year old. A virtual
by infants. Thus, in contrast with Piaget's theory of
infant, if you like. The abilities we want our agent,
developmental stages (Ginsberg & Opper 1988), we can
which we call Neo, to develop include learning, planning,
now envision a continuous developmental trajectory|
language, an organized memory containing structured
for conceptual knowledge, at least|beginning with simknowledge, and attention. Central to these abilities is a
ple, interactional primitives in infancy (relationships
conceptual structure, an ontology, a way to \carve the
among actions and objects in the physical world, for exworld at its joints." Given a conceptual structure, we
ample) and becoming more elaborate through abstraccan see a developmentalpath to more advanced thought,
tion and metaphorical extension as the agent develops
including emotion and consciousness. As Neo develops,
(Lako & Johnson 1980). Indeed, Mandler's work, to
we expect to learn much about the nature of accessiwhich we owe much, outlines such a developmental trable representations, the functions of categories, and the
jectory and the empirical evidence for it (Mandler 1988;
representation and roles of goals. We will elucidate the
1992). One contribution of the current paper is to show
relationship between activity, attention, memory and
that a simulated infant can learn concepts in roughly
learning. We hope to demonstrate that an agent can
the way Mandler suggests real infants learn.
There is a strong temptation to see in the infancy
Permission to make digital/hard copies of all or part of this material for
personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that the copies are
literature
evidence of nativism, the idea that infants
not made or distributed for pro t or commercial advantage, the copyright
are born with conceptual structures. Obviously, babies'
notice, the title of the publication and its date appear, and notice is given
that copyright is by permission of the ACM, Inc. To copy otherwise, to
minds have some structure at birth, but we are antirepublish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires speci c
permission and/or fee.
nativist, minimalist in our approach. We do not agree
c 1997 ACM
Agents '97 Marina del Rey CA USA
that babies must be born with theories of the physical

world (Carey & Gelman 1991), and in fact we show that
Neo can learn concepts given very little prior structure.

Baby World

Neo is a virtual agent who lives in a simulated environment. Babyworld implements Neo's sensations, mental
representations, mental and physical activities, and the
behavior of objects and other agents that interact with
Neo. Babyworld has two parts: one, which we call Neo,
implements everything that Neo does, including learning, moving, looking, crying, and so on. The other part,
called StreamsWorld, represents Neo's internal and external environment, and it implements events that happen in and around Neo and in response to Neo's actions.
Notably, StreamsWorld represents Neo's sensations of
its external environment and also internal states such
as hunger. No distinction is made between \inside" and
\outside"; Neo must learn it.
Neo senses its environment through a collection of
streams, which are divided into discrete time steps. On
each time step t, a stream  holds a token  , that is,
 =  . Tokens represent sensations or processed percepts. For example, one token is \rattle-shape," and it
is placed in the appropriate stream whenever Neo's eyes
point at an object that is shaped like a rattle; that is,
sight;shape t =rattle-shape. (We will discuss the bias
this tactic engenders in a later section.) The streams
that represent Neo's internal sensations include an affect stream that contains tokens such as happy and sad,
a pain stream, a hunger stream, and somatic and haptic
streams that are active when Neo moves and grasps.
The Babyworld simulator is simple and probabilistic.
For example, Neo gets hungry some time after eating,
it cries when it is unhappy or in pain; when Neo cries,
Mommy usually visits, unless she is angry at Neo for
crying, in which case she stays away. Neo falls asleep
intermittently; it can move its arm and head, and grasp
several objects, including three rattles, a bottle, a mobile, a bunch of metallic keys, and a knife. The latter
causes pain. The rattles make noise when shaken.
Currently, Neo is incapable of anything we would call
volition. If Neo's eyes alight on a rattle then Neo will
grasp the rattle with some probability. However goaldirected this might appear, Neo's mind contains nothing
that could be interpreted as a goal.
i

i;t

;

How Neo Learns

What does Neo's mind contain, then? Fluents, mostly.
Fluents represent things that don't change, or that
change in highly regular, predictable ways. Fluents are
a step away from the state-based representations of AI
planning research, such as situation calculus, toward
script-like representations. Fluents explicitly represent
events that have duration; in fact Neo learns the mean
and variance of the duration of each uent. The sound

made by a rattle is a uent, so is the sensation of holding the rattle, and so are the visual sensations of the
shape and color of the rattle. Of course, the concept
\rattle" has all these components, so somehow, uents
for the color, shape, sound and texture of a rattle must
be linked up in a single uent. Neo accomplishes this,
building larger uents from smaller ones, with two simple learning rules that count cooccurrences. First, if
Neo notices that two uents often start and stop simultaneously, it infers that the uents are parts of a larger
one. This rule learns uents that represent objects and
states. Second, if Neo notices that one uent often follows another, it infers that both are parts of a larger
uent that represents an activity. The word \often" in
these rules hides a statistical inference that uents cooccur more frequently than one would expect by chance if
they were independent.
The important features of uents as representations
are that they represent states or processes with temporal extent (even objects are represented as things
that exist over time), they are composable, and they
are learned by counting cooccurrences. Although the
simplest uents represent sensations, it's important to
recognize that uents are not identical with sensations.
Sensations are tokens in streams; uents are representations stored in memory. Streams are the locus of Neo's
sensory experience, uents are the locus of Neo's knowledge. And although Neo's earliest uents are just copies
of its sensations, they soon become aggregated and abstracted.
All the examples in this paper are from a single \run"
of Neo, lasting 30,000 time steps. (A time step corresponds to one second of real time. The run we describe
here thus corresponds to roughly eight hours of Neo's
life.) Fluents are learned gradually: It might take hundreds or thousands of time steps to nd enough cooccurrences to create a uent, and composite uents are
obviously learned after their components.
Having said Neo combines small uents into larger
ones, we should say where the small uents come from.
One approach is to say the smallest uents are token
values that persist in streams. For example, red and
rattle-shape are each persistent tokens because Neo
tends to look at objects for several time steps before
shifting its gaze; if Neo is currently seeing something
red, then it will probably see something red on the next
time step. Our rst implementation of Neo had individual, persistent tokens as the smallest uents, but there
were too many ways to combine these uents, and most
produced larger uents that didn't correspond to anything in Neo's environment. We decided that the smallest uents should be larger than individual tokens. And
if the smallest uents contained, say, two tokens, from
di erent streams, then we could use the covariance of
streams to focus Neo's attention on pairs of tokens that

\go together," as we will now describe.

Scopes

The rst things Neo learns are not uents, but rather,
pairs of streams in which to look for uents. These pairs
are called scopes. A stream  is said to change state at
time t, denoted (i; t), when  ;1 6=  ; that is, 
changes state at time t when it contains a di erent token
at time t than it did at time t ; 1. Conversely, (i; t)
means the stream doesn't change state:  ;1 =  .
Neo learns a scope, s , when streams  and  change
together often. Said di erently, Neo learns s when the
joint event (i; t) & (j; t) occurs frequently relative to
the joint events (i; t) & (j; t) and (i; t) & (j; t).
To assess the relative frequencies of these events, Neo
uses contingency tables like this one:
i
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(sight-color,t) (sight-color,t) total
(sight-shape,t) 2996
945
3941
25232
26058
(sight-shape,t) 826
total
3822
26177
29999

This says that the streams sight-shape and sightcolor changed state simultaneously 2996 times, and

one changed when the other didn't 945 + 826 = 1771
times. To assess the strength of association between
sight-shape and sight-color we square the frequency
in the rst cell of the contingency table (2996) and divide by the product of the rst row and rst column
margins (3941 and 3822, respectively). The maximum
value for this statistic is 1.0, and for the table above it
is 29962=(3941  3822) = :596.1
Neo maintains contingency tables for all pairs of
streams.2 When the measure of association for a table exceeds a threshold, a scope is created. Table 1
shows the top ten scopes learned by Neo in a run of
30,000 timesteps (i.e., the scopes with the highest measures of association), and also the ten worst scopes. Notice that the sight-shape and sight-color streams are
more highly associated than any except do-sleep and
sleep. Other high-ranking scopes are (sound voice),
1 Neo could use other statistics, such as 2 and G, provided the contingency table is scaled to a constant total,2
preserving the proportions. (Scaling is necessary because 
and G are not independent of sample size.) In practice, Neo
learns the same scopes, and ranks them similarly, irrespective of how it measures association in its contingency tables.
2 While this may seem like a lot of bookkeeping, especially
as the number of streams grows, bear in mind that maintaining a contingency table is a very simple operation. All the
contingency table updates could be done in unit time on a
parallel machine. At higher levels of processing, operations
may become more complex and require non-local data. In
that case, we view it as the purpose of the attentional mechanism to keep processing per unit time down to reasonable
level. Deciding what particular events in the environment
require attention, i.e. merit being assigned computational
resources, is a future direction of our research.

which makes sense because changes in the sound stream
are often produced by changes in the voice stream;
and (tactile-mouth mouth), which captures the fact
that when Neo starts to mouth (i.e., chew on) an object, it gets tactile sensations in its mouth. The worst
scopes represent pairs of streams that are not associated. For example, there is no association between
sleeping and eating, and none between moving the arm
(do-arm) and hunger. Note that many scopes include
do-x streams; for example, (do-voice voice). These
are the components of Neo's actions: the do-voice part
represents the sensation of attempting to use the voice,
and the voice part represents the sensory feedback from
actually using the voice. Sometimes, Neo will experience do-voice but not voice; for example, Neo might
try to make a sound (do-voice) but be unable to because it has an object in its mouth.
Before Neo learns any scopes, its world is a \blooming, buzzing confusion" of changing token values in 26
streams. Scopes \chunk" streams into covarying pairs.
Without scopes, Neo has to learn uents by searching
for associated token values across all 26 streams. For example, Neo has to consider associations between (sightcolor red) and, for instance, (sleep asleep), (hunger
full) and (voice screaming). With scopes, Neo can
limit its search for associations. Suppose Neo learns
the scope (sight-color sight-shape) but it learns no
other scopes relating sight-color to any other stream.
Then, it should look for associations between (sightcolor red) and tokens in the (sight-shape) stream,
but it needn't look for associations in any other streams.
Empirically, scopes make an enormous di erence in
the number and quality of the associations Neo learns.
Without scopes, Neo learns many thousands of meaningless associations between token values; with them,
Neo learns a few hundreds of associations that correspond to objects and activities in its environment.

Base Fluents

Whereas scopes represent the tendency of streams to
change state simultaneously, Neo's smallest uents,
called base uents, represent cooccurring tokens within
scopes. Suppose stream  contains a at time t ; 1 and
b at time t. Then we say token a stops in stream i
at time t ; 1, denoted a(i,a,t-1), and token b starts in
stream i at time t, denoted `(i,b,t). Now suppose Neo
turns its head and its eyes alight on a red rattle. Neo
will detect two simultaneous events, `(sight-color,red,t)
and `(sight-shape,rattle-shape,t). Sometime later,
Neo might look somewhere else, which will generate two simultaneous stop events, a(sight-color,red,v)
and a(sight-shape, rattle-shape,v). Simultaneous start
events and stop events are evidence that a single
object|in this case a red rattle|or a single activity,
is making its presence felt in two streams. Of course,
two unrelated events could occur simultaneously in two
i

10 Best Scopes
do-sleep sleep
sight-color sight-shape
sound voice
arm arm-speed
do-mouth mouth
do-voice voice
tactile-mouth mouth
sound do-voice
tactile-mouth do-mouth
do-head head

measure of 10 Worst Scopes
association
1.0
.596
.533
.453
.326
.325
.315
.276
.274
.254

measure of
association
sleep arm-x-angle
0
arm-x-angle arm-y-angle
0
do-sleep arm-x-angle
0
do-sleep eat
0
sleep eat
0
tactile-skin tiredness
0
do-arm hunger
0
do-sleep arm-y-angle
0
sleep arm-y-angle
0
tactile-mouth hunger
0

Table 1: The ten best and ten worst scopes learned by Neo in 30,000 timesteps.
streams, but this sort of coincidence is less likely than
the coincidence of related events.
Neo looks for associations between start and stop
events within scopes. For example, having the scope
(sight-color sight-shape), Neo can try to associate
red and rattle-shape. But if Neo lacks a scope for,
say, sight-color and arm-speed, then it will never try
to associate red with fast. Thus scopes prevent Neo
from even considering many meaningless base uents.
Contingency tables count the cooccurrences of start
and stop events, and assess whether start and stop
events happen simultaneously signi cantly often. For
example:
`(sight-color,
`(sight-shape,

65

total

237
302

rattle-shape,t)
`(sight-shape,
rattle-shape,t)

red,t)

`(sight-color,

red,t) total
27
92

1931
1958

2168
2260

Of the 2260 times sight-color and sight-shape
changed together, rattle-shape became active 92
times, both rattle-shape and red became active 65
times, and red became active but rattle-shape didn't
237 times. The conditional probability of rattle-shape
starting clearly depends on whether something red or
non-red started; these probabilities are 65=92 = :71
and 27=92 = :29, respectively. Conversely, the conditional probability of something red starting depends on
whether something rattle-shaped started. In short, red
and rattle-shape are associated. The strength of their
association can be measured many ways; one was described in the previous section. Here, we use a modi ed
G statistic. Because G is sensitive to sample size, all
contingency tables are rst scaled to maintain their proportions but have their totals equal 100. To scale the
table above, each cell value and marginal total would be
divided by 226. Then the G statistic is calculated for
the scaled table in the usual way.

Neo accepts a base uent when its contingency table is signi cant, as measured by the G statistic. Actually, the table above tells us only that red and
rattle-shape often start simultaneously, we also need
to establish that they often end simultaneously. For
this, Neo maintains another table like the previous
one for the events a(sight-shape,rattle-shape,t), a(sightcolor,red,t), and their complements. When Neo has evidence that red and rattle-shape both start and stop
together in their respective streams, and do so more
often than would be expected by chance if they were independent, then it forms the base uent ((sight-shape
rattle-shape)(sight-color red)).
To summarize the story to this point, Neo learns
scopes, or pairs of streams that often change together.
As soon as it has learned a scope, Neo can use it to
learn base uents, which are scopes instantiated with
particular token values, such as ((sight-shape rattleshape)(sight-color red)). And as soon as Neo has
learned some base uents, it starts combining them into
larger structures called composite uents.

Composite Fluents

Whereas base uents represent associations between
cooccurring token values in streams, composite uents
represent cooccurring uents. Neo currently forms two
kinds of composite uents. Conjunctive uents are generated when uents F1 and F2 start together signi cantly often, and they also end together signi cantly
often. Clearly, conjunctive uents are like base uents.
However, base uents combine token values into uents,
whereas conjunctive uents combine other uents; and
conjunctive uents are not constrained by scopes. Contingency tables, like those described earlier, tabulate
the frequencies of the joint events (` F1 & ` F2),
(` F1 & ` F2), (` F1 & ` F2) and (` F1 & ` F2 ). The
modi ed G statistic, described above, tells Neo whether
the association between F1 and F2 is signi cant. If so,
Neo forms the uent (AND F1 F2 ).

The second kind of composite uent is formed when
one uent starts in the context of another one. Suppose Neo is holding a rattle, and then it starts to chew
on the rattle (called \mouthing"). While it is holding the rattle, the uent ((tactile-hand wood)(hand
close)) is active, and when it starts mouthing, the uent ((tactile-mouth wood)(do-mouth mouth)) will
become active. The latter uent starts in the context of
the former. If this happens signi cantly often then Neo
will form the context uent
(CONTEXT ((tactile-hand wood)(hand close))
((tactile-mouth wood)(do-mouth mouth)))

The contingency tables for context uents are updated in a slightly di erent way from previous tables.
When uent F2 starts at time t + i, Neo checks to see
whether uent F1 is active, and if so, it updates the
rst cell of the contingency table, (` F1; t & ` F2; t + i).
If F2 starts and F1 isn't active, then Neo updates the
third cell of the table, (` F1; t & ` F2 ; t + i). If F1 is
active but F2 doesn't start within a window of i time
steps, then Neo increments the second cell of the table,
(` F1 ; t & ` F2; t + i). The modi ed G statistic tells
Neo whether F2 starts in the context of F1 more often
than would be expected by chance if F1 and F2 were
independent.

Chains

Context uents can be chained together to form multiuent sequences. Consider the previous context uent
and the following one:
(CONTEXT ((tactile-mouth none) (voice cry))
((tactile-hand wood) (hand close))

These uents share a common uent, ((tactile-hand
wood) (hand close)), so they may be composed into
a chain:
(CHAIN ((tactile-mouth none) (voice cry))
((tactile-hand wood) (hand close))
((tactile-mouth wood)(do-mouth mouth)))

In words, Neo had nothing in its mouth and was crying,
then it grabbed something wooden, then it started to
mouth something wooden. Now consider another, very
similar, chain:
(CHAIN ((tactile-mouth none) (voice cry))
((tactile-hand plastic) (hand close))
((tactile-mouth plastic)(do-mouth mouth)))

The only di erence between these chains is the object that Neo grabs and mouths: in the rst case it is
wooden, in the second, plastic. We may form a class of
things that Neo can grab and mouth. The chains don't
say exactly which objects are in the class, but we know
they are either wood or plastic, and they are graspable,
and mouthable.3
3 In general, we don't know that the object being grabbed

is identical with the object being mouthed, but the Neo sim-

Classes

Note that \graspable" and \mouthable" are interactional properties (Lako 1984) that characterize Neo's
activities in its environment. Unlike \texture"|wood
or plastic|they are fundamentally subjective. What's
graspable by one agent isn't necessarily graspable by another. Whereas texture is an inherent property of an object, graspable is a property of the object and the agent
who may try to grasp it. Objective features such as texture have gotten a bad name because they appear inadequate for conceptual activities such as forming classes
and judging similarity; for instance, it is dicult, perhaps impossible, to de ne a category in terms of necessary and sucient objective features. One is tempted
by the conjecture that categories might be de ned in
terms of necessary and sucient interactional features,
instead. However, we will try to show that categories
are best de ned in terms of activities, and the apparent superiority of interactional features is due to them
describing activities better than objective features.
Consider a conceptual activity such as judging
whether a cup and a ladle are similar or di erent. We
immediately want to ask, \Similar or di erent in what
context?" As devices for transferring liquid, cups and
ladles are similar; as containers to drink from, they require di erent motor schemas; as something to serve
co ee in at an elegant dinner, they aren't similar. Note
that the required context in which we judge similarity
is often an activity, often purposeful, and often agentcentered. What's central to judging the similarity of objects is knowing which activities the objects are involved
in. Activities seem to select which features of objects are
relevant to judgments of similarity; these features will
sometimes be objective, often interactional.
Why would Neo even want to have concepts, in particular classes? In a nutshell, because they capture the
structure of Neo's environment. Classes enable Neo to
make predictions about never before seen situations. If
Neo had formed the class of \rattle", and was given
a new rattle that resembled its old ones in some way,
it could immediately infer that this new object can be
grasped, held, and may even make a noise when shaken.
All the entailments of \rattle," all the things a rattle
can be used for and how it is expected to behave, are
immediately transferable to this new object. One can
also imagine that once a class has been established, a
symbol could be fairly easily attached to it. This symbol makes it possible for an agent to communicate its
experience succinctly, with just one \word". It can also
reason about its experiences, for example during planning, at a level higher and more easily manageable than
the raw sensory data.
Neo's activities are not purposeful because Neo has
ulator is simple enough that this general problem doesn't
arise. It will, eventually.

no goals, but even so, Neo's activities|represented as
chains|are a basis for judging similarity and forming
some classes. In fact, although Neo learns chains, we
are responsible for using these chains to identify features
and form classes. This is how we do it: We match up
chains that have the same stream names in the same
order, creating an abstract chain, then form classes of
the token values. Consider these chains:
(CHAIN ((do-arm resting) (arm resting))
((do-hand close) (hand close))
((tactile-mouth wood) (mouth mouthing)))
(CHAIN ((do-arm resting) (arm resting))
((do-hand close) (hand close))
((tactile-mouth plastic) (mouth mouthing)))
(CHAIN ((do-arm move-rt) (arm move-rt))
((do-hand close) (hand close))
((tactile-mouth wood) (mouth mouthing)))
(CHAIN ((do-arm move-rt) (arm move-rt))
((do-hand close) (hand close))
((tactile-mouth plastic) (mouth mouthing)))

Looking only at stream names (e.g., do-arm, arm, dohand, ...) we see that all these chains are instances
of this abstract chain: (do-arm arm) ! (do-hand
hand) ! (tactile-mouth mouth). What we're seeing
in the four chains, above, is two activities:
resting arm !
closing hand !
mouthing something
right-moving arm !
closing hand !
mouthing something
and the \something" in each activity is either wood or
plastic. It may not be immediately apparent how these
activities identify classes of objects, but in fact the objects that can participate in these activities are just
those objects that can be grasped, mouthed, and are
either wood or plastic. We know, because we built the
Neo simulator, that these objects include Neo's rattles
and bottles, but not the mobile, Mommy, or Neo's own
hand. (Incidentally, if Neo had run longer, it might
have learned that its keys can also participate in the
abstract chain, above, in which case the instantiated
chains would have included a uent ((tactile-mouth
metallic)(mouth mouthing)).) The point is that
the class of objects that can participate in an activity
is identi ed by interactional and objective features|
graspable, mouthable, wooden, plastic or metallic.
Although Neo is currently not capable of it, we can
imagine showing Neo a novel object, say, a small wooden
block, that Neo would classify with its rattles, bottles
and keys on the basis of being graspable and mouthable,
and wooden, plastic or metallic. Similarly, if we show
Neo a graspable but immovable wooden object, Neo

might put it in the same class as its crib bars. Again,
this classi cation would be made on the basis of activities. When Neo interacts with the new object it would
form a chain that includes ((do-hand close) (hand
close)) ((do-arm move-rt)(arm not-move))|after
grasping, Neo tries to move its arm but it cannot. Assuming that Neo has learned a similar chain in its interactions with the crib bars, it will be able to form
the class of objects that can be grasped but cannot be
moved.
What Neo can do is less spectacular, but promising. One of the most interesting abstract chains is only
two uents long: ((do-head head) ! (sight-shape
sight-color)). This chain identi es many of the physical objects in Neo's environment. For example,
(CHAIN ((do-head lookup)(head lookup))
((sight-shape mobile-like)
(sight-color green)))

This chain says, when Neo directs its head to look up,
and actually looks up, then it will see the green mobile.
Here are two more examples:
(CHAIN
((do-head look+90)(look +90))
((sight-shape crib-like)(sight-color white)))
(CHAIN
((do-head look-90)(look -90))
((sight-shape crib-like)(sight-color white)))

In words, when Neo looks either to its extreme left (+90)
or extreme right (-90) it sees its crib.
Remarkably, uents that represent the color and
shape of objects do not appear in any other chains
learned by Neo; in other words, the ((do-head head)
! (sight-shape sight-color)) chain represents an activity that de nes the class of objects based on their
appearance after a head turn.
Classes of actions can be learned in the same way. For
example, here are four chains that Neo learned quickly
and observed frequently:
(CHAIN ((do-arm move-up) (arm move-up))
((sight-movement fast) (arm-speed fast)))
(CHAIN ((do-arm move-dn) (arm move-dn))
((arm-movement fast) (arm-speed fast)))
(CHAIN ((do-arm move-rt) (arm move-rt))
((sight-movement fast) (arm-speed fast)))
(CHAIN ((do-arm move-lf) (arm move-lf))
((sight-movement fast) (arm-speed fast)))

The abstract chain is (do-arm arm) ! (sightmovement arm-speed), and it de nes a class of actions in which, in the context of an arm movement, Neo
sees the arm moving fast.

Physical Schemas

We have seen how uents can be used to de ne activities (by abstracting regularities in streams over time),

and how a set of related uents can be used to implicitly de ne a category such as \graspable object." This
type of conceptual knowledge is still relatively speci c
to Neo's capabilities and the particulars of Neo's environment. What if it were possible to abstract an even
more general kind of uent that represents activities or
classes across domains ? We call such data structures
physical schemas, and postulate that they are central
to the development of a cognitive agent. Their uses
include providing a basis for communication between
agents (by establishing a common frame of reference),
forming the building blocks for further abstract categories, and bridging the gap between an agent's sensorimotor behavior and its higher level cognitive skills.
Conisder as an example for a physical schema the notion of \containment". It looks deceptively simple, but
actually covers a great number of situations, at varying
levels of abstraction. In terms of an agent's activities,
there is a di erence between containing a block in a box
(which will generally stay there if left alone) and containing a ock of sheep within an unfenced eld, which
requires constant intervention by the agent. Di erent
contexts will require di erent containers: A cage will
contain an animal, but not a liquid. There are even
such concepts as containing a thought within one's head,
which doesn't even involve a palpable object. Lako and
Johnson have proposed that abstract concepts are understood by metaphorical extension from basic schemas
such as this one. You understand what it means to contain a thought within your head by relating it to the
process of containing something within your hand, for
example. In this view, people communicate and reason
using such metaphors, which are derived from the physical structures of our bodies and the way we interact with
the world. By giving us the ability to redescribe our
world in more familiar terms, they make understanding
it possible.
Could a concept like containment be represented with
uents? We believe so, although a great deal of work
clearly remains to be done. The key is noticing that
once again, physical schemas like all other concepts are
de ned via an agent's activities. Containing something
could be thought of as being able to push it back into a
speci ed state should it move out of that state. If Neo
had simple uents for \moving" and \pushing" (simple
since they correspond to basic e ector actions, and are
easily described physically), it should be able to learn
that when it can successfully and repeatedly keep an
object within a state by pushing it (applying force to
it), it has \contained" that object.
Like containment, all physical schemas share the
property of being domain general, grounded in physical activities and physical relationships such as \move,"
\push," and \in," while providing a very abstract concept. Further examples are \support", \control", and

\cause". The total number of such schemas may not be
very large. It is our hypothesis that these concepts are
so generally useful that they will emerge in any intelligent agent placed in any reasonable domain.

What Neo Knew and What It Learned

It is sometimes argued that real babies are born with
\faculties" for physical and spatial reasoning (Carey &
Spelke 1994), language (Pinker 1995), even reasoning
about living things (Keil 1994). Nobody believes that
much can be learned without constraints from perceptual systems, e ectors, and prior mental structures, so
the question is not \whether" but \how much." Although we eventually expect to show that Neo can acquire a rich conceptual structure from minimal beginnings, at present, we can show no such thing, because
Neo's conceptual structure is quite poor|Neo learned
hundreds of uents and chains but these produced very
few classes of objects and activities|and Neo's prior
structure is not insigni cant. Let us review what Neo
was born knowing:
Streams and Tokens. Neo experiences its world
through streams, and streams contain tokens such as
red and hungry.
A Notion of Events. Neo's learning methods all focus on start (`) and stop (a) events. Static streams or
uents don't interest Neo's learning methods.
Methods to Learn Scopes and Base Fluents. Neo
is born with a method to nd correlations among start
and stop events in streams. The resulting structures,
called scopes, constrain the simplest uents Neo learns.
Base uents are statistically signi cant instantiations of
scopes with tokens. Neo is born with a method, based
on contingency tables, for learning base uents.
Methods to Learn Composite Fluents. The
method for learning conjunctive uents (and base uents) is based on the idea that simultaneity is rare, so
when it is observed, it probably has a single cause. The
method for learning context uents and chains is based
on the idea that events sometimes follow others more often than expected by chance if they were unrelated, so
when this is observed, the events are probably causally
related. The learning methods for base, conjunctive and
context uents all rely on contingency table analysis,
but the tables are set up slightly di erently.
Now consider what Neo learned:

 It learned that most of the regularity in its environment takes place in 30 pairs of streams, less than 10%
of the (26  25)=2 = 325 pairs of streams that it might
have focused on.

 It learned base uents corresponding to the shape and
color of every object in its environment.

 It learned the permanent locations of the green mo-

bile (directly overhead) and the crib bars (to the extreme left and right of its eld of view). No other
objects have permanent location, because Neo can
move them, but interestingly, it learned locations for
objects that it let sit for a long time.
 It learned activities, such as grasping an object and
mouthing it, or moving its arm and seeing its arm
move.
 It almost learned conditions. For example, it
learned a chain that includes ...((do-hand open)

(hand open)) ((tactile-mouth skin) (mouth
mouthing)), but it has no way to learn that the

rst uent is a condition for the second|that the
hand must be open to be mouthed.
 It learned chains from which we, the authors, abstracted classes that make sense in Neo's environment, such as the class of objects that can be grasped
and mouthed, and the class of activities that end in
seeing the arm moving fast.
Keep in mind that Neo's actions are largely random:
when it grabs an object it can mouth it, but it's just as
likely to drop it, or move its head. Using the conceptual
structure learned to guide further knowledge acquisition
is the next step in our research program. The only structure in Neo's actions is provided by conditions (e.g., it
cannot mouth an object it hasn't grasped, and it cannot mouth its hand unless the hand is open) and by
a handful of simple behavioral dependencies built into
the simulator (e.g., it sometimes grabs what it looks at,
and it cries if it gets hungry). Keeping in mind also that
Neo ran for only 30,000 time steps, it seems to us that
it learned quite a lot.

Related Work

Attempts to build complete cognitive systems such as
the one we are proposing have been rare; some examples follow. Andreae viewed his PURR-PUSS system as a general approach to building an intelligent
agent (Andreae 1977). It resembles Neo in that it is
based on few general design principles, primarily trying
to predict its future sensory experiences and exploring
those aspects of its environment that it cannot fully explain. Unfortunately, though, PURR-PUSS was limited by its somewhat rigid approach and the lack of
available computing power at the time. Soar (Laird,
Newell, & Rosenbloom 1987) is also viewed by its designers as an architecture for intelligence and a theory
of cognition. However, Soar requires a lot of builtin structure, e.g. production rules and ultimate goal
states, and places no value on learning through interaction. The learning it does, called chunking , is limited
to storing problem solving experiences for future use.

Neo, on the other hand, attempts to build structures
that will help it explain its environment. Brooks' Cog
project has a lot in common with Neo, both in motivation and general design principles (Brooks & Stein 1993;
Brooks 1996). He views cooccurrence of events as key to
learning, and emphasizes the importance of embodiment
for the emergence of human-like behavior and conceptual knowledge. We di er from Brooks, however, in that
we do not feel that a physical embodiment|as opposed
to simulation|is absolutely necessary.
The principle of interactivity in learning has been
nding growing support in recent years even in AI circles
(e.g. (Kuipers & Byun 1991; Mataric 1992)). Drescher
has taken Piaget's principles of elaboration and accommodation to heart (Drescher 1991). His system elaborates \context{action{result" triples into schemas that
resemble the uent representation we use, although they
are somewhat less general and not as directly grounded
in sensory experience. The agent forms new concepts by
creating \synthetic items" to denote unknown aspects
of the world that are responsible for some regularity in
the observed schemata.
There is a vast amount of work in the eld of Arti cial Life describing aspects of animal behavior and animal interaction within societies. Into this broad area
falls Bates' work on arti cial characters (Bates 1992;
Reilly & Bates 1992). There are even some very realistic and fairly complete models of individual animals, e.g.
shes (Terzopoulos, Tu, & Grzeszczuk 1994). We do not
place too much emphasis on modeling animal or human
behavior, however. Instead, we are trying to develop a
general mechanism for the acquisition of abstract conceptual knowledge, and show how such knowledge might
be useful to the agent.

Conclusion

The goal of the Neo project is to build a virtual infant that learns many of the cognitive skills that we
expect from a three-year old. Underlying these skills is
a conceptual structure, an ontology, a way to \carve the
world at its joints." This conceptual structure identi es
classes, and supports judgments of similarity. Following Lako , Johnson, Mandler and others, our position
is that concepts are based in activities. Neo's uents
represent objects, states, dependencies and activities.
We believe that they can be extended to learn very abstract and general \physical schemas". We were able to
identify classes by examining Neo's learned activities,
thus providing the rst evidence from this project that
conceptual structure can be learned by interacting with
the environment.
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